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"This morning, for breakfast, he requested something called wheat germ, or-
ganic honey, and Tiger's Milk."
"Oh yes, those are the charmed substances that some years ago were felt to
contain life-preserving properties."
"You mean, there was no deep fat? No steak, or cream pies, or hot fudge?"
"Those were thought to be unhealthy, precisely the opposite of what we now
know to be true."
"Incredible!"
From Woody Allen's 1973 movie Sleeper, about a man who falls asleep in
1973, and awakens two hundred years later.
I. INTRODUCTION: RECOGNIZING THE SCIENTIFIC-COMMERCIAL SPEECH
CONUNDRUM
Imagine, for a moment, that Congress has enacted the "False and
Misleading Medical and Scientific Reporting Act of 1990." The law is
premised on a fear that scientific quackery may cause significant socie-
tal harm by confusing the public and inducing its members to seek out
costly, worthless, and possibly harmful medical cures or supposed scien-
tific advances. The Act establishes a special commission of scientific
and medical experts to rule on the accuracy of any proposed scientific
or medical theory that conceivably could cause public harm or confu-
sion. Such scientific or medical assertions must be substantiated to the
commission's satisfaction, or the speaker risks issuance of a cease and
desist order, imposition of criminal penalties, or both.
Only the narrowest of free speech theorists1 would find this statute
to meet the requirements of the first amendment. Indeed, most observ-
ers 2 would recoil at the creation of such a governmentally imposed "Big
1. One such exception, at least prior to his confirmation hearings, would have been Judge
Robert Bork, who wrote that "[tihere is no basis for judicial intervention to protect any... form
of expression [other than political speech], be it scientific, literary or that variety of expression we
call obscene or pornographic." Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 20 (1971). Robert Nagel is another scholar who would provide only very limited protec-
tion to speech of any kind. See R. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSE-
QUENCES OF JUDICIAL R.vIEW 27-59 (1989). He appears to make no special mention of scientific
expression, however.
2. See, e.g., Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REv. 245, 262
(urging protection of scientific speech); see also T. EmERSON, THE SYsTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExsREs
SION 6-7 (1970) stating:
[F]reedom of expression is an essential process for advancing knowledge and discovering
truth. An individual who seeks knowledge and truth must hear all sides of the question, con-
sider all alternatives, test his judgment by exposing it to opposition, and make full use of
different minds. Discussion must be kept open no matter how certainly true an accepted opin-
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Brother" of scientific inquiry. In part, this is because imposing a gov-
ernmental pall of intellectual orthodoxy is inconsistent with the as-
sumptions traditionally deemed to underlie a free society. The ability to
engage in uninhibited intellectual inquiry and communication is essen-
tial to the mental and personal development of the individual.' This
development is indispensable if individuals are to participate actively in
the governing of their lives, an activity inherent in a democratic
system.4
The instinctive repugnance felt toward this hypothetical statute
derives from another premise of a fundamentally democratic society:
what might be labeled the "principle of epistemological humility." This
principle posits that whatever the currently prevailing beliefs may be,
history teaches us that scientific or moral advances may at some future
point make those beliefs appear either silly or monstrous.5 Accordingly,
the Supreme Court has said "there is no such thing as a false idea"
under the first amendment.8 "However pernicious an opinion may seem,
we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries
but on the competition of other ideas."17 While the Court was quick to
distinguish assertions of basic fact,8 assertions of scientific fact tradi-
tionally are viewed as similar to the expression of ideas,' because both
fall within the zone of the epistemological humility principle. Hence,
any attempt by the government to impose a national scientific ortho-
doxy could undermine or inhibit the advance of scientific knowledge,
thus undermining a key value of the first amendment. 10
Despite the protection given by traditional first amendment theory
to scientific assertions, when the very same assertions are part of a com-
mercial promotion of a product, attitudes change dramatically. Govern-
mental regulation of product health claims demonstrates the clearest
ion may seem to be; many of the most widely acknowledged truths have turned out to be
erroneous.
3. See T. EMERSON, supra note 2, at 6. My own analysis of this free speech value appears in
M. REDISH, FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION: A CRrrIcAL ANALYsis 19-29 (1984).
4. See Walker, A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy, 60 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 285
(1966). John Stuart Mill is often associated with the developmental value of democracy. See gener-
ally J. MILL, ON LI ERTY (1978).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 55-61.
6. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
7. Id. at 339-40.
8. Id. at 340.
9. See supra note 2.
10. See B. NEUBORNE, FREE SPEEcH-FREE MARKmTs-FREE CHOICE: AN ESSAY ON COMMER-
CIAL SPEECH 2 (1987) (footnote omitted):
The laws that govern the physical and social universe can never be revealed except through a
vigorous exchange of hypotheses and information that permits the identification of error and
the recognition of scientific progress. We rightly sense that interference with free speech
threatens to freeze conventional perceptions of reality into permanent intellectual prisons.
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application of this dichotomy today. Because of both the public's strong
desire for information about how the use or consumption of a product
may affect one's health and the often uncertain, controversial, and
changing nature of medical science, the government, on numerous occa-
sions, has regulated health claims made on behalf of various commercial
products. Both the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)1 and the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA)12 exercise regulatory authority over
health claims for various products. Regulation also has been sought at
the state level, primarily through attempted judicial enforcement
against allegedly deceptive product health claims.' 3
A number of free speech commentators quite probably would find
little constitutional difficulty with these regulations. Many commenta-
tors believe that so-called commercial speech automatically is rendered
beneath first amendment concerns. 4 The Supreme Court once provided
commercial speech similarly short shrift, 5 but in more recent years it
has recognized that such expression deserves a level of constitutional
protection beyond the trivial.', The Court has made clear, however,
11. The FTC's authority derives from § 12 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (Act), 15
U.S.C. § 52 (1988), which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation to disseminate, or cause to be
disseminated, any false advertisement . . . [b]y any means, for the purpose of inducing, or
which is likely to induce, directly or indirectly, the purchase in or having an effect upon com-
merce of food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics.
In addition, § 5 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988), which applies to advertising for more than
merely foods, provides that "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are
declared unlawful." According to one group of authorities, "A central principle in FTC law is that
if advertising claims are not adequately substantiated they will be regarded as deceptive or un-
fair." J. CALFEE & J. PAPPALARDO, How SHOULD HEALTH CLAIMS FOR FOODS BE REGULATED? AN
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 7 (1989).
12. J. CALFEE & J. PAPPALARDO, supra note 11, at 5 (footnote omitted): "FDA authority over
disease prevention claims in food marketing arises from the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act...
which prohibits the sale of misbranded foods or drugs in interstate commerce." Section 403(a) of
the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act provides that "[a] food shall be deemed to be misbranded [if] its
labeling is false or misleading in any particular." 21 U.S.C. § 343 (1988). See generally Hutt, Gov-
ernment Regulation of Health Claims in Food Labeling and Advertising, 41 FOOD DRUG COSM.
L.J. 3 (1986).
13. A current example is the proceeding brought in Texas state court by the State of Texas
against the Quaker Oats Company. The State alleges that "Quaker has embarked upon a campaign
of deception, designed to entice Texans who are concerned about their cholesterol levels and the
risk of heart attack to buy and consume Quaker's oatmeal and oat bran products ... as a substi-
tute for traditional medical treatment" and that Quaker is "motivated solely by the base purpose
of selling as much of Quaker's products as possible." Plaintiff's Original Petition at 3, Texas v.
Quaker Oats Co., (Dist. Ct., Dallas County, Texas, Sept. 7, 1989) (No. 89-10762-M).
14. See, e.g., Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IowA L.
REv. 1 (1976); Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First
Amendment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1 (1979); see also infra Part IH(B).
15. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
16. See, e.g., Linmark Assocs. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (holding that prohibition on
"for sale" signs on lawns violated the first amendment); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
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that commercial speech receives only the limited protection commensu-
rate with its inferior position in the scale of first amendment values. 17
Consequently, the Court has allowed certain forms of regulation for
commercial speech that clearly would be impermissible for more tradi-
tional subjects of expression. 8
I have argued that this disparate treatment of commercial speech is
not justified by any legitimate understanding of first amendment the-
ory.19 One need not dispute the Court's reduced level of protection
given to commercial speech, however, in order to reject reduced protec-
tion for assertions of scientific theory about a product contained in a
commercial advertisement. Such speech appropriately is viewed not as
commercial, but rather as fully protected scientific expression. To hold
otherwise would be to penalize traditionally protected expression for no
reason other than the communicator's personal motivation for making
that expression. Motivation never has influenced the level of protection
given to speech in other contexts20 and its use cannot be rationalized
under first amendment theory.2'
This does not mean that assertions of scientific theory contained in
commercial advertisements deserve absolute protection. The Court
never has provided such an extreme degree of protection to even the
most traditional subjects of expression;22 therefore, full protection to
scientific-commercial speech would not require an absolute constitu-
tional shelter. In the presence of either a truly compelling governmental
interest23 or a finding of conscious or reckless falsity, all speech may be
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (protecting advertisement of prescription
drug prices).
17. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978) (allowing bar to discipline
lawyer for soliciting a client).
18. See, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (allowing state to prohibit optometrists
from practicing under trade names); Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 447. For further discussion, see M. RED-
ISH, supra note 3, at 63 (footnotes omitted): "[T]he Court has felt free to allow regulation of com-
mercial speech when it is shown merely that damage 'may' occur, or that harm is 'likely,' or that
there is a 'possibility' of harm. These standards are clearly unacceptable in virtually any other area
of first amendment application."
19. See M. REDISH, supra note 3, at 60-68. See generally Redish, The First Amendment in
the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
429 (1971).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 76-78.
21. See infra Part MI(B).
22. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640,
650 (1981) (stating that as "a general matter, it is clear that a State's interest in protecting the
'safety and convenience' of persons using a public forum is a valid governmental objective"); New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (defamation of public official not protected if
said with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth or falsity); Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494 (1951) (political advocacy of unlawful conduct is not protected); Feiner v. New York,
340 U.S. 315 (1951) (speech prohibited to prevent reaction by a hostile audience).
23. See cases cited supra note 22.
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regulated.24 The same should be true of scientific-commercial speech.
Scientific-commercial speech should receive the same level of constitu-
tional protection given to pure scientific expression with only one lim-
ited exception required by certain historical differences. Under the
approach advocated here, before a court upholds governmental regula-
tion of assertions of scientific theory contained in commercial advertise-
ments, it first should have to inquire whether the regulation of the same
assertion, made to the same audience by an individual lacking a profit
motive, would be upheld. Certain guidelines may be provided to help
answer this question in specific instances. 5 Regardless of how the re-
viewing court chooses to resolve this issue, the answer generally should
not vary on the basis of the presence or absence of the profit motive.
Governmental regulation of product health claims can take one of
two general forms, depending on the nature of the government's as-
serted interest for the regulation. Initially, the government conceivably
might wish to prohibit all health claims concerning a particular group
of products, such as foods, because of a fear that the public could mis-
construe or exaggerate such claims. Second, the government might wish
to prohibit as false or deceptive claims found either to be inconsistent
with scientific consensus or to fail a type of cost-benefit analysis that
weighs the potential benefit of the advertising against its potential
harms. The former type of regulation has been employed in the past by
the FDA in the labeling of foods.2 6 The latter traditionally has been
used by the FTC in the regulation of product advertising,27 and a simi-
lar approach is likely to be employed in the future by the FDA.2 8
These regulatory options give rise to distinct first amendment
problems, and the remainder of this Article is devoted to their examina-
tion. Part II considers the constitutionality of a total ban on health
claims by certain products, and concludes that such a ban is unconsti-
24. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times, 376 U.S. at 254.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 136-38.
26. See J. CALFEE & J. PAPPALARDO, supra note 11, at iv (noting that more "health informa-
tion had not appeared in food labeling earlier because the Food and Drug Administration ...
officially prohibited this use of health findings for many years").
27. See id. at viii. While the FTC employed the "consensus" method in negotiating a ban on
tar and nicotine advertising in 1960, its current "substantiation" doctrine is an application of what
Calfee and Pappalardo refer to as the "expected value" rule, which states:
Under this doctrine the decision to allow or prohibit an advertising claim is based upon a
comparison of the likely costs and benefits of each action. A rigid consensus is not uniformly
required to support accurate claims. Put simply, the FTC's policy allows manufacturers to use
information surrounded by scientific debate as long as the scientific finding is accurately rep-
resented, the degree of evidence is not misrepresented, and the claim passes a rough cost-
benefit test.
Id. at viii-ix.
28. See 21 C.F.R. pt. 101 (1990) (food labeling rules).
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tutional even under the reduced level of protection given by the Su-
preme Court's commercial speech precedents.29 Part III examines the
government's authority to regulate scientific assertions concerning
products' health effects when those assertions are deemed to be incon-
sistent with current consensus.
II. BANNING ALL PRODUCT HEALTH CLAIMS: CONSTITUTIONALITY UNDER
THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
No federal regulatory agency presently adheres to the policy that
all health claims by certain product categories are impermissible.3 0 Un-
til recently, however, the FDA followed a policy similar to an absolute
bar, 1 and in any event an examination of the constitutionality of such a
practice can be valuable as a working measure of how far regulators
may go in inhibiting scientific-commercial expression.
A total ban on product health claims violates the first amendment
regardless of whether my argument that product health claims be
deemed fully protected scientific expression is accepted. Even under the
reduced protection that the Supreme Court accords to commercial
speech, a total ban likely would be found unconstitutional.
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commis-
sion12 announced the Court's current test for protection of commercial
speech. In Central Hudson the Supreme Court adopted a four-part
standard for commercial speech protection under the first amendment:
(1) it must concern lawful activity and not be misleading; (2) the gov-
ernment interest must be substantial; (3) the regulation must directly
advance the governmental interest asserted; and (4) it must not be
more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.3 The level of pro-
tection provided by this test is noticeably less than that given tradi-
tional subjects of expression;34 however, its impact is by no means
negligible 3 5
In the case of a total ban on product health claims, the state's as-
serted interest in preventing the public from exaggerating the implica-
tions of concededly truthful claims is not "substantial" and is
inconsistent with the precepts underlying the first amendment, 3  be-
29. See infra text accompanying notes 32-34. But see infra note 35 and accompanying text.
30. See J. CALx. & J. PAPPALARDO, supra note 11, at iv-v.
31. See id. at iv.
32. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
33. Id. at 566.
34. See cases cited supra note 22.
35. Employing this standard, the Court has invalidated regulations of commercial speech in
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983), as well as in Central Hudson itself.
36. See Justice Brandeis's famed concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
375-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring):
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cause it is premised on the fear that the public cannot be trusted to
make valid judgments about truthful expression. For example, in Vir-
ginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc."7 the Court invalidated a prohibition on the advertising of prices of
prescription drugs, rejecting the argument that consumers might give
such information undue weight. The Court, in referring to this ap-
proach as "highly paternalistic," reasoned that price information should
not be assumed harmful in itself, because people will discern their best
interests when they are well informed through free and open, rather
than closed, channels of communication. In any event, said the Court,
the first amendment has made the choice "between the dangers of sup-
pressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely
available. s3
The same logic would seem to apply directly to the government's
asserted interest in banning even concededly truthful health claims. Al-
lowing the government to require the withholding of truthful informa-
tion relevant to lawful activity because of a fear that the public will
misunderstand that information abandons the essential premise of
democratic government, namely that the individual can assess compet-
ing information and make lawful, life-affecting choices on the basis of
that assessment. 9
The only factor conceivably complicating this analysis derives from
Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Posadas de Puerto Rico
Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico. 40 In upholding Puerto Rico's
partial ban on the advertising of legalized casino gambling, Justice
Rehnquist reasoned that "the greater power to completely ban casino
gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of ca-
sino gambling."' 41 If this logic is generalized, it would seem to all but
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make men
free to develop their faculties.. . . They believed that freedom to think as you will and to
speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth...
and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as
applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law ....
If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the
evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced
silence.
37. 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (the decision initially recognizing substantial protection for commer-
cial speech).
38. Id. at 770.
39. For further discussion, see A. MEIKLEJOHN, PoLrrmcA FREEDoM 27 (1960): "The principle
of the freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the program of self-government.. . . It is
a deduction from the basic American agreement that public issues shall be decided by universal
suffrage."
40. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
41. Id. at 345-46.
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eliminate any first amendment protection for commercial speech. The
government's power to prohibit commercial activity is, for all practical
purposes, plenary. 42 If the supposedly "greater" power to regulate com-
mercial activity is thought logically to subsume the "lesser" power to
regulate promotion of that activity, then the government's constitu-
tional authority to regulate commercial speech far exceeds that envi-
sioned by the Central Hudson test.43 That the Court intended to adopt
so dubious a proposition, however, is highly unlikely.
Because Justice Rehnquist in Posadas at least purported to adhere
to and apply the Central Hudson test,44 it is difficult to believe that the
Court intended to adopt a constitutional philosophy so fundamentally
inconsistent with that test. More importantly, the greater-includes-the-
lesser philosophy is directly at odds with seventy years of Supreme
Court first amendment jurisprudence concerning the advocacy of un-
lawful conduct. Since its famed decision in Schenck v. United States,45
which adopted the clear-and-present danger test, the Supreme Court
consistently has provided at least some degree of first amendment pro-
tection to such advocacy. 46 Yet, if Justice Rehnquist's logic is accepted,
presumably Congress could ban all such advocacy, because by hypothe-
sis Congress could ban-indeed, already has banned-the conduct ad-
vocated by such expression. Justice Rehnquist, then, necessarily would
be overruling every Supreme Court decision since 1919 concerning the
constitutional protection for unlawful advocacy.47 Merely based on Jus-
tice Rehnquist's comment, it is difficult to believe that a majority of the
Court concurs in such a conclusion. The fatal flaw in Justice Rehn-
quist's reasoning is that he actually has reversed the "greater" and the
"lesser." His logic effectively reduces the greater first amendment pro-
tection of expression to the considerably lesser fifth amendment protec-
42. The government's power is constitutionally limited only by the virtually nonexistent sub-
stantive due process requirement of legislative rationality. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961) (upholding Sunday closing laws); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S.
106 (1949) (allowing limits on advertisements on vehicles).
43. See supra text accompanying notes 32-35. The Central Hudson test provides far more
substantial protection to commercial speech than the Court gives to commercial conduct.
44. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 340-44.
45. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
46. In Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969), the Court declared:
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid
or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such actions.
47. Even decisions largely unprotective of speech recognize that advocacy of unlawful con-
duct is deserving of at least some level of constitutional protection. See, e.g., Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (applying an ad hoc balancing test); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
668-70 (1925) (finding antisedition statute reasonable).
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tion afforded commercial conduct.
The Court, in a decision last term, appears to have rejected indi-
rectly Justice Rehnquist's specious Posadas logic. In Board of Trustees
v. Fox48 the Court modified one element of the Central Hudson test.
While acknowledging that the Court repeatedly has stated that govern-
ment restrictions upon commercial speech may be no more broad or no
more extensive than "necessary" to serve a substantial interest,49 Jus-
tice Scalia's opinion for the Court noted that the government does not
have the burden of demonstrating that the type of restriction is "the
least severe that will achieve the desired end."50 He emphasized, how-
ever, that the test is far different from the fourteenth amendment ra-
tional basis test because the government's goal must be substantial, and
the cost carefully calculated. "Moreover, since the State bears the bur-
den of justifying its restrictions, it must affirmatively establish the rea-
sonable fit we require."'"
The Fox Court's continued adherence to the broad outlines of Cen-
tral Hudson demonstrates that Justice Rehnquist's logic in Posadas has
not led to the demise of meaningful first amendment commercial
speech protection. Moreover, Justice Scalia's distancing of the commer-
cial speech standard from the rational basis test also underscores the
Court's rejection of Justice Rehnquist's analysis, because that analysis
logically would have led to the use of the rational basis standard in
commercial speech cases.5 2 Thus, Central Hudson remains the gov-
erning standard, and even as modified in Fox,53 there should be little
doubt that a total ban on product health claims would be
unconstitutional.
Regulatory agencies' inability to ban product health claims, how-
ever, does not necessarily mean that they lack authority to prohibit or
penalize health claims found to be false or misleading. If such claims
were characterized as commercial speech, the courts would deny them
constitutional protection because they clearly fail Central Hudson's
first prerequisite: that the speech "not be misleading. 5 4 Nevertheless,
it is not clear that product health claims should receive the reduced
level of first amendment protection afforded commercial speech. I now
turn to this issue.
48. 109 S. Ct. 3028 (1989).
49. Id. at 3032.
50. Id. at 3035.
51. Id. (citation omitted).
52. See supra text accompanying notes 45-47.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 48-51.
54. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); see
supra text accompanying notes 32-35.
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III. REGULATING "FALSE" PRODUCT HEALTH CLAIMS: ESTABLISHING THE
INTERSECTION OF COMMERCIAL AND SCIENTIFIC EXPRESSION
A. Scientific Expression and the Principle of Epistemological
Humility
Few free speech observers would find constitutionally tolerable a
widespread system of governmental suppression of scientific opinion,55
even when that opinion differed dramatically from the prevailing scien-
tific consensus. The validity of the principle of epistemological humility
is shown by recalling only a few of the many times throughout history
when widespread scientific consensus subsequently proved to be piti-
fully inaccurate. From the suppression of Galileo's adoption of Coperni-
cus's theory that the earth rotates around the sun 56 to the medical
profession's early rejection of Pasteur's germ theory"7 to the prerelativ-
ity theory assertion by a leading physicist that only minor advances re-
mained for physics 58 to the FTC's contention, as recently as 1950, that
cigarette smoking was not harmful to healthy adults, 59 by now we
should have learned our lesson. Indeed, only recently some have begun
to challenge the consensus concerning the connections between certain
foods and cholesterol, on the one hand, and between high cholesterol
and heart disease, on the other hand.6 0 Thus, viewed from the broad
perspective of history, any attempt by the government to lock in a pre-
vailing scientific consensus is likely to be either futile or dangerous. In
addition, such attempts undermine both the search for knowledge and
the development of a free and open exchange of information and opin-
ion, traditionally deemed central values served by the right of free
61expression.
The belief that the very same scientific claims automatically lose
their full level of constitutional protection when made by a product
manufacturer in a commercial advertisement needs some logical basis,
55. See supra text accompanying notes 2-4.
56. See Moore v. Gaston County Bd. of Educ., 357 F. Supp. 1037, 1042 (W.D.N.C. 1973)
(recounting Galileo's story). See generally G. DE SANTILLANA, THE CRIME OF GALILEO (1955).
57. See R. DuBos, Louis PASThuR FREE LANCE OF SCIENCE 248 (1950).
58. In 1899 famed physicist A.A. Michelson stated: "The more important fundamental laws
and facts of physical science have all been discovered, and these are so firmly established that the
possibility of their ever being supplanted in consequence of new discoveries is exceedingly remote
.... Our future discoveries must be looked for in the sixth place of decimals." F. RICHTMEYER, E.
KENNARD & J. COOPER, INTRODUCTION TO MODERN PHYsIcs 43 (6th ed. 1969).
59. "The record shows ... that the smoking of cigarettes... in moderation by individuals
... who are accustomed to smoking and who are in normal good health... is not appreciably
harmful." R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 42 F.T.C. 706, 724 (1950); see Calfee, The Ghost of Ciga-
rette Advertising Past, REG. Nov.-Dec. 1986, at 35, 37.
60. Moore, The Cholesterol Myth, ATLANPIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1989, at 37.
61. See supra text accompanying note 36.
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in terms of free speech theory, for the drawing of such a strict dichot-
omy. It is doubtful, however, that such a basis may be found.
B. Economic Motivation and Free Expression: The Difficulty of
Defining Commercial Speech
Those who conclude that commercial speech deserves either only
limited first amendment protection"2 or none at all6" naturally bear the
burden of defining that concept. Presumably, any principled definition
should turn on the reason for separating commercial speech from other
forms of expression. For example, if the basis for this dichotomy is the
assumption that the first amendment is designed solely to facilitate the
processes of self-government,64 and that commercial speech is irrelevant
to attainment of that value,65 then the definition will depend on the
subject matter of the expression. The logic behind this assumption
would have to be that the subject of the comparative merits of commer-
cial products is irrelevant to political decision making.
The adoption of that definition also logically would exclude from
first amendment protection speech such as warnings from consumer ad-
vocates about certain products or the findings contained in Consumer
Reports magazine, because those concern the identical subject matter
discussed in commercial advertisements. Yet the Supreme Court clearly
has not provided a reduced level of first amendment protection to Con-
sumer Reports,6 and that treatment is fully consistent with the Court's
general definition of commercial speech. In Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.6 7 and subse-
quent decisions, the Court has characterized commercial speech as
"speech which does 'no more than propose a commercial transac-
tion.' "68 Very few advertisements actually do nothing more "than pro-
pose a commercial transaction," including many of the advertisements
62. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 1.
64. See, e.g., A. MSIJEJOHN, supra note 39; Bork, supra note 1.
65. See, e.g., Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 14.
66. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984) (recogniz-
ing the applicability of the New York Times v. Sullivan conscious-or-reckless-falsity test to a mag-
azine article about a commercial product).
67. 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976).
68. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983) (quoting Virginia
State Board, 425 U.S. at 762, and Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Rela-
tions, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). In Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), the Court defined "com-
mercial speech" as "expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its
audience." Id. at 561. After Bolger, however, the Court "again seems to equate commercial speech
and commercial advertising," and "seemed to equate the two even in Central Hudson." Shiffrin,
The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away From a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 1212, 1222 n.70 (1983).
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characterized by the Court as commercial speech.6 9 Thus, the Court
seems to mean that the proposal of a commercial transaction is a neces-
sary, though perhaps not sufficient,70 condition for inclusion within the
definition of commercial speech. This approach excludes from the defi-
nition of commercial speech both Consumer Reports and consumer ad-
vocates because neither is proposing a commercial transaction.
Under this definitional structure, one could understand how scien-
tific claims asserted in commercial advertisements might-though need
not 7 1-be distinguished, for first amendment purposes, from the same
claims when made by those lacking a direct financial interest: commer-
cial advertisements "propose a commercial transaction," but the scien-
tific claims made by so-called objective experts do not. The logic of the
Court's definitional approach reasonably may be questioned, however,
because it is unclear why an otherwise fully protected statement loses
full protection when a proposal for a commercial transaction is
appended.
The presence of a proposal for a commercial transaction cannot be
the sole element that determines whether speech is commercial speech
if one rationalizes reduced protection on the grounds that commercial
speech is unrelated to effective self-government, 72 because the same is
true of a comment on commercial products that contains no such pro-
posal. Arguably, inclusion of a proposal for a transaction takes the
speech out of the realm of the pure exposition of ideas and brings it
closer to the concept of "action."7 The first amendment, however,
never has been thought to be the exclusive preserve of abstract ideas.
74
69. Bolger is an illustration. See infra text accompanying notes 112-17.
70. A persuasive argument could be fashioned that when the predominant element of the
communication necessarily concerns a traditionally protected subject, the inclusion of a proposal
for a transaction should not be enough to render a statement commercial speech. See infra text
accompanying note 120. Purely as a predictive doctrinal matter, however, the Court probably
would deem any statement including such a direct proposal to be "commercial." See infra text
accompanying note 121.
71. See supra note 70.
72. See, e.g., Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 14.
73. Professor Emerson has argued that "a fundamental distinction must be drawn between
conduct which consists of 'expression' and conduct which consists of 'action.' 'Expression' must be
freely allowed and encouraged. 'Action' can be controlled, subject to other constitutional require-
ments, but not by controlling expression." T. EMERSON, supra note 2, at 17. Thus, "when the com-
munication is so close, direct, effective, and instantaneous in its impact that it is part of the
action," he believes it should not be protected by the first amendment. Id. at 404. That Professor
Emerson would define a communication merely including a proposal for a transaction as "action,"
rather than "expression," however, is highly doubtful under these definitions.
74. As Justice Holmes wrote, "Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and if
believed it is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the
movement at its birth." Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., joined by Bran-
deis, J., dissenting).
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Advocacy of action has long been considered to fall within classic con-
cepts of protected expression. 5 Indeed, there would be no small degree
of irony in rationalizing reduced protection for commercial speech on
the grounds that the proposal of a commercial transaction constitutes
"action," while a consumer advocate's urging of the public not to buy a
product simultaneously is viewed as fully protected "expression."
The only other conceivable rationale for the Court's reliance on the
presence of a commercial proposal in its definition of commercial
speech is the simple fact of the profit motivation for the speech. The
Court must be understood as saying that otherwise fully protected
speech loses some or all of its constitutional protection when the
speaker stands to profit financially from the listener's acceptance of the
argument being made.
This logic is doubtful from the perspective of first amendment the-
ory. A speaker's motivation, standing alone, never has reduced the level
of constitutional protection given particular types of expression. Thus,
one who defames a public figure may speak out of the most evil motives
of spite, religious or racial hatred, or vengeance, yet those statements
are protected fully unless uttered with knowledge of their falsity or
reckless disregard of their truth or falsity. 6 Similarly, a newspaper usu-
ally includes expression for the sole purpose of financial gain, yet that
expression is fully protected under the first amendment.7 7 Scholars
have defended the Court's penalization of commercial speech because of
its profit motivation by arguing that "[w]hatever else it may mean, the
concept of a first amendment right of personal autonomy in matters of
belief and expression stops short of a seller hawking his wares. '7 8 This
mode of reasoning, however, which might be labeled "proof by hyper-
bolic pejorative," does little either to advance the analysis or to expli-
cate the Court's logic.
Professor Baker presented a somewhat more tempered-though no
less fallacious-rationale in the exposition of his "liberty model" of free
speech.79 Professor Baker believes a fundamental rationale for free
speech protection is the desire to foster communication that defines or
develops "the self."80 Because "the values supported or functions per-
75. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). See generally Redish, Advocacy of
Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment: In Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CAI.
L. REv. 1159 (1982).
76. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see also Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,
485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988) (holding that constitutional protection of public discourse does not depend
upon the motivation for the expression).
77. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 266.
78. Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 14, at 14.
79. Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978).
80. Id. at 992.
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formed by protected speech result from that speech being a manifesta-
tion of individual freedom and choice," ' Baker concludes that speech
which "does not represent an attempt to create or affect the world in a
way which can be expected to represent anyone's private or personal
wishes" is undeserving of first amendment protection. 2 Baker reasons
that although the speech may cause change or advance knowledge, if it
"is not a manifestation of the speaker's values," it does not serve this
liberty value and is not protected.8 Market forces, rather than individ-
ual choice, dictate what and how much a commercial enterprise will ad-
vertise, he argues, 4 and, therefore, commercial advertising should be
unprotected.
Excluding scientific assertions made by commercial advertisers
from the scope of fully protected expression while fully protecting iden-
tical assertions when made by a neutral scientist or when reported in a
newspaper makes perfect sense, if Professor Baker's theory is accepted.
Professor Baker's fallacies, however, are both numerous and fatal.8 5 Ini-
tially, if the first amendment right consists at least in part of the lis-
tener's right to receive information, 6 then the speaker's motive
logically should be irrelevant to the analysis. An equally important
point, largely ignored by Professor Baker,8 7 is that many people make a
living by means of self-expressive work. 8 Many speakers stand to
achieve direct personal gain in one way or another from the listener's
acceptance of their speech-from the political candidate seeking elec-
tion to the picketing welfare recipient seeking an increase in benefits. If
the constitutional protection of speech were reduced or eliminated
solely on the basis of a speaker's motivation for personal gain, consider-
ably more than commercial advertising would be affected. Indeed, one
could argue persuasively that even objective scientists have strong per-
sonal interests in the acceptance of the truth of their assertions, be-
81. Baker, supra note 14, at 3.
82. Id.
83. Baker, supra note 79, at 991 n.86.
84. See generally Baker, supra note 14.
85. I have explored the fallacies of Professor Baker's analysis in detail in Xi REDISH, supra
note 3, at 30-36, 49-52.
86. Both respected commentators and the Supreme Court have stated this view in the con-
text of noncommercial speech. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)
(stating that "the Court's decisions involving corporations in the business of communication or
entertainment are based not only on the role of the First Amendment in fostering individual self-
expression but also on its role in affording the public access to discussion, debate, and the dissemi-
nation of information and ideas"); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)
(stating that it "is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is
paramount"); A. MEIKLUJOHN, supra note 39.
87. See M. REDISH, supra note 3, at 50-52.
88. Id. at 50.
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cause disbelief of those assertions will do little to help their careers.
Similarly, a newspaper obviously possesses a strong commercial interest
in the public's acceptance of its claims about the health impact of cer-
tain products. For example, when a sensationalist tabloid proclaims
that onions prevent heart attacks, 9 many purchase the newspaper be-
cause they wish to learn a new method of improving their health; they
presumably would not buy the newspaper unless they thought the claim
had at least some basis in fact.
Perhaps support for Professor Baker's analysis can be found in the
recently developed theories of the modern civic republican scholars,
who decry the existence of interest groups and their influence over a
political process that should be defined by the common good. 0 Because
commercial advertisers presumably are motivated solely by the desire
to increase profits, the modern republican theorists might wish to ex-
clude commercial speech from the scope of first amendment protection.
The civic republicans, however, are misguided in their efforts to define
a coherent, objective concept of common good, because they effectively
are attempting to superimpose their externally derived political values
on the populace in total derogation of the fundamental notion of self-
determination. The essential premise of self-determination is that indi-
viduals may choose to govern their lives in the manner they believe
best, even if that includes acting in their own self-interest. The civic
republicans' belief in imposition of a distinct common good directly
conflicts with this value.91 In any event, even modern republican schol-
ars acknowledge that private interests are relevant inputs into politics.2
Thus, their acceptance of Professor Baker's "liberty model" as the ex-
clusive measure of free speech protection is not clear.
The Court does not appear to have adopted Professor Baker's "lib-
erty model." The Court has provided full protection to corporations'
contributions to debate about public issues, despite the obvious profit
motivation for those communications.9 3 Professor Baker acknowledges
that these decisions are wholly inconsistent with his theoretical frame-
89. See The Globe, Feb. 20, 1990, at 7, col. 1.
90. See, e.g., Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALt L.J. 1539, 1540, 1550 (1988)
[hereinafter Beyond the Republican Revival]; see also Sunstein, Interest Groups in American
Public Law, 38 STAN. L. Rav. 29, 29 (1985).
91. See Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process:
An "Institutionalist" Perspective, 83 Nw. U.L. REv. 761, 761-64, 775-83 (1989).
92. See, e.g., Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 90, at 1541.
93. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Conm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (newsletter
mailed with utility bill); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980)
(same); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (advertisement giving bank's views on
proposed tax).
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work,94 and the decisions themselves make clear that the Court has not
adopted Professor Baker's "liberty model." In these decisions the Court
has noted that a "company has the full panoply of protections available
to its direct comments on public issues. '9 5
This concession by the Court makes all but unintelligible its pre-
requisite to the categorization of expression as commercial speech that
the speech propose a commercial transaction, because combining these
two principles results in the following enigma: Speech solely concerning
commercial products or services is not necessarily commercial speech,
since, under the Court's definition, if the discussion of products or ser-
vices does not propose a commercial transaction it is considered fully
protected speech.9 6 Yet the mere presence of a profit motive for expres-
sion does not automatically render speech "commercial," because by
the Court's own acknowledgement a corporation's direct contributions
to public debate are fully protected. Thus, under the Court's prece-
dents, neither a commercial subject matter nor the presence of a profit
motive is a sufficient condition for a finding that particular expression
constitutes commercial speech. The Court, then, seems to require the
presence of both a commercially oriented subject matter and a speaker
motivated by profit to support a finding of commercial speech. Yet the
Court's willingness to find speech fully protected when either one of the
two is absent renders dubious its willingness to reduce protection when
both are present. If discussion of commercial products is not included
automatically within the commercial speech category, and if the exis-
tence of a profit motive fails to achieve the same result, the Court effec-
tively has acknowledged that neither factor renders speech
"commercial."
Those who oppose protection of commercial speech might well re-
spond that the answer simply is to deny full protection to the profit
motivated speaker in all contexts, despite the reference to public issues
and the absence of a direct request for purchase. That analysis, how-
ever, effectively would undermine the well-established principle that a
speaker's motivation is irrelevant to the level of first amendment pro-
tection given particular speech.9 7 More importantly, such an analysis
effectively would punish a speaker solely because of his profit motiva-
tion and would, therefore, constitute an irrational insertion of an anti-
capitalistic philosophy into a supposedly politically neutral free speech
94. Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and Redish's The
Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 646 (1982).
95. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983) (citing Consolidated Edison,
447 U.S. at 530).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 66-70.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 76-78.
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theory."'
A synthesis of the Court's "propose-a-commercial-transaction" pre-
requisite for a finding that speech is commercial and its simultaneous
acknowledgement that a corporation enjoys "the full panoply of [first
amendment] protections available for its direct comments on public is-
sues,'" reasonably might conclude that a commercial enterprise would
have a fully protected right to discuss the scientific merits of its prod-
uct, as long as it did not urge purchase directly. While probably accu-
rate, this conclusion is by no means certain. In Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Corp. the Court recognized a distinc-
tion between fully protected "institutional and informational"
messages, on the one hand, and those "clearly intended to promote
sales," on the other.100 Because any statement by a commercial enter-
prise about the scientific properties of its product could be deemed "in-
tended to promote sales," it is conceivable that the Court would
characterize any such statement as proposing a commercial transaction.
The problem, however, is that the Court erroneously has viewed state-
ments that are "informational" and those which are "intended to pro-
mote sales" as mutually exclusive. This need not be the case. The
confusion results primarily because the Court has evolved this commer-
cial versus informational distinction in cases in which the informational
statement and the promotional element actually are severable; in prod-
uct health claims, on the other hand, the two issues are intertwined
inextricably.
A synthesis of the Court's approach to the dichotomy may be de-
rived by contrasting three decisions: Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products
Corp.,'0' Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission,0 2 and
First National Bank v. Bellotti.'03 In Consolidated Edison the Court
invalidated the state public service commission's suppression of bill in-
serts by the company that discussed controversial public issues. 04 The
Court relied on its earlier decision in Bellotti'05 to reject the assertion
that a state may restrict corporate speech to specified issues. 10 6 In Bel-
98. See Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (stating that "above all else, the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content"); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of N.Y.U., 360
U.S. 684, 688 (1959). See generally Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wi.
& MARY L. REV. 189 (1983).
99. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 68.
100. 447 U.S. 557, 562 n.5 (1980).
101. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
102. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
103. 435 U.S. 765 (1978); see also Pacific Gas & Elec., 475 U.S. at 1.
104. 447 U.S. at 544.
105. 435 U.S. at 765.
106. Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 533.
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lotti the Court had framed the question for decision as "whether the
corporate identity of the speaker deprives. . proposed speech of what
otherwise would be its clear entitlement to protection." Justice Powell,
answering the question in the negative, noted that "the Court has not
identified a separate source for the right [of free speech] when it has
been asserted by corporations. ' 10 7 He reasoned that "the Court's [free
speech] decisions involving corporations in the business of communica-
tion or entertainment are based not only on the role of the First
Amendment in fostering individual self-expression but also on its role
in affording the public access to discussion, debate, and the dissemina-
tion of information and ideas." 10 8 He therefore could "find no support
. . . for the proposition that speech that otherwise would be within the
protection of the First Amendment loses that protection simply because
its source is a corporation.' ' 0 9 While the Court was unwilling to define
the outer reaches of this corporate right,10 it did note that "[e]specially
where . . . the legislature's suppression of speech suggests an attempt
to give one side of a debatable public question an advantage in expres-
sing its views to the people, the First Amendment is plainly of-
fended." ' Doctrinally, under both Consolidated Edison and Bellotti,
once it is acknowledged that a product's scientific properties or impact
on health represent "public issues," a corporation must have a first
amendment right to contribute to debate on those issues. This right is
subject to the strong protections of a compelling interest analysis,
which is above and beyond its more limited commercial speech right.
In Bolger, however, the Court attempted to explain the factors that
determine whether the exercise of corporate speech falls within the
comment-on-public-issues category or under the less protected commer-
cial speech heading. Bolger concerned a first amendment challenge to a
federal statute 1 2 that prohibited the mailing of unsolicited advertise-
ments for contraceptives. Youngs, a contraceptive manufacturer, pro-
posed a mailing of advertisements that would include informational
material discussing "public" issues such as venereal disease and family
planning."' While the Supreme Court ultimately found the postal ser-
vice's prohibition of Youngs's mailing to be unconstitutional," 4 it ini-
107. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 780.
108. Id. at 783.
109. Id. at 784.
110. Id. at 777.
111. Id. at 785-86 (footnote omitted).
112. 39 U.S.C. § 3001(e)(2) (1988).
113. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 62 & n.4.
114. Youngs, said the Court, was proposing commercial speech presenting "truthful informa-
tion relevant to important social issues" and, therefore, was protected by the first amendment
under the commercial speech doctrine. Id. at 69.
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tially rejected Youngs's argument that the pamphlets should not be
deemed less protected commercial speech because they included discus-
sion of social issues. Merely because these pamphlets are advertise-
ments does not require the conclusion that they are commercial speech,
and "the reference to a specific product does not by itself render the
pamphlets commercial speech," Justice Marshall's opinion reasoned. 115
Additionally, Youngs's economic motivation alone clearly would be in-
sufficient to turn the materials into commercial speech."' Somewhat
curiously, however, Justice Marshall concluded that "[t]he combination
of all these characteristics . . . provides strong support for the District
Court's conclusion that the informational pamphlets are properly char-
acterized as commercial speech. 1" 7 Under the Bolger analysis, then, the
combined presence of the advertisement context, the reference to a spe-
cific product, and an economic motivation for the expression appear to
dictate a finding of commercial speech.
One might assume, under Bolger's three-factor test, that an adver-
tisement by a manufacturer discussing a product's scientific properties
would be classified as commercial speech and thus receive the reduced
protection provided by the Central Hudson test,"8 although that same
information, if conveyed by a neutral party, undoubtedly would be
characterized as fully protected speech. That conclusion, however, does
not follow necessarily, as can be seen by examining the specific factual
context in which the Bolger Court developed its test. In Bolger the in-
formation about public issues and the commercial promotion were
linked gratuitously. As the Court expressly recognized," 9 Youngs quite
easily could have distributed pamphlets discussing the general
problems of venereal disease and family planning without simultane-
ously promoting its specific products. In developing its test, the Court
made its concern clear: "Advertisers should not be permitted to immu-
nize false or misleading product information from government regula-
tion simply by including references to public issues."' 20
When, however, a public issue directly concerns a product-for ex-
ample, the effect of oat bran on cholesterol-to characterize everything
a manufacturer says about the scientific properties of its product as
115. Id. at 66.
116. Id. at 67.
117. Id.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34.
119. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66-67.
120. Id. at 68. Of course, to the extent the discussion of venereal disease or family planning
concerned the role of prophylactics, as a generic matter, in the treatment of the former or the
implementation of the latter, the situation in Bolger would be quite similar to the case of product
health claims. In such an event, the Court's conclusion that the advertisement and the public
discussion were not inextricably intertwined would have been incorrect.
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commercial speech effectively revokes a corporation's "full panoply of
protections available to its direct comment on [that] public issue[],"''
a right conceded by the Bolger Court itself. Thus, when a particular
product and a public issue are intertwined inextricably, if Bolger's defi-
nition of commercial speech is not to consume the fully protected cor-
porate right to comment on public issues,122 the following ground rules
would have to be recognized: If a real scientific debate about the health
impact of a product exists, the manufacturer would retain a fully pro-
tected right to comment on that debate, as long as it did not promote
simultaneously and directly the sale of the product. This comment
would receive full first amendment protection, even though the likely
and intended impact of the comment on the listener would be the crea-
tion of a desire to purchase that product.
One reasonably could criticize this doctrinal resolution because it
draws irrational distinctions. On the one hand, if we begin with the pre-
mise that a manufacturer's promotion of its product deserves only the
reduced first amendment protection given to commercial speech, it
should make no difference whether the promotion is direct or indirect.
On the other hand, if a corporation is recognized as having a fully pro-
tected first amendment right to comment on public issues, even if the
corporation has a concrete financial interest in that issue, and if it is
conceded generally that the health impact of a corporation's product is
a public issue, why is that corporate right any less valuable once the
corporation adds a direct promotion?
One response to these criticisms is that, purely on the narrow doc-
trinal level of court positivism, 123 this resolution is the only conceivable
means of reconciling the two coexisting lines of Supreme Court prece-
dent on the matter. If one were ultimately to conclude, however, that
this suggested doctrinal resolution is fatally illogical, then it should be
clear, in terms of fundamental free speech theory, which of the two doc-
trinal lines should prevail. When a product's health impact is character-
ized as a public issue, a corporation must possess a fully protected right
to state its side of the argument, because those on the other side of the
public debate will retain the "full panoply of protections' ' 24 for their
commentary. Otherwise, the public would be deprived of information
and opinion on one side of the argument, in direct contravention of fun-
121. Id.
122. See supra notes 104-11 and accompanying text (discussing Consolidated Edison and
Bellotti); supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text (discussing Bolger).
123. See PoweU, Reaching the Limits of Traditional Constitutional Scholarship (Book Re-
view), 80 Nw. U.L. REv. 1128, 1136-37 (1986).
124. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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damental precepts of free speech theory. 12 5 Exclusion of corporate com-
mentary on regulatory issues, for example, effectively amounts to a
governmental preference for speech advocating regulation and govern-
mental disdain for belief in a free market economy, because the speech
of those advocating regulation will receive full protection, but those
with the strongest incentive to oppose regulation-the corporations
subject to that regulation-will receive only the reduced protection
given commercial speech. Just as "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does
not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics,' '126 neither does the first
amendment embody their rejection. To the contrary, the first amend-
ment was largely designed to prevent just such governmental viewpoint
preference.127
Similarly, to rationalize an exclusion of corporate commentary from
full protection because corporations have a direct financial interest in
the outcome of the debate would alter dramatically traditional first
amendment values. If such grounds exclude corporations from full first
amendment protection, then comments by Michigan automobile work-
ers urging an increase in automobile import tariffs or urgings by senior
citizens for an increase in social security benefits logically would have to
receive reduced protection as well, because the speakers clearly possess
a direct financial interest in the outcome of the public debate to which
they directed their commentary. These examples, in which no one seri-
ously could doubt that full first amendment protection would be pro-
vided, should make clear that the first amendment never has been
interpreted to reduce protection because of a speaker's private eco-
nomic motivation. The public may appropriately discount a speaker's
commentary on the basis of an economic motivation, but this does not
mean that such commentary is inherently false or lacking in persuasive
value. Indeed, this is especially likely to be true for product health
claims when those possessing both the most substantial resources to
fund research and the strongest incentive to do so are the commercial
manufacturers.
C. Establishing the Contours of Constitutionally Valid Regulation
It should be clear at this point that a corporation's health claims
for its products receive full first amendment protection, at least under
certain circumstances. But the Supreme Court never has equated full
first amendment protection with absolute protection. A compelling gov-
125. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
126. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
127. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
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ernmental interest may justify regulations of content.128 It is necessary,
then, to set out the contours of constitutionally valid governmental reg-
ulatory authority over product health claims.
Initially, the Court never has extended first amendment protection
to conscious falsehoods or to statements made with reckless disregard
of truth or falsity. 2 " Thus, if one making a health claim for a prod-
uct-either the manufacturer or an objective scientific observer-is
found knowingly to have communicated a falsehood or to have been
reckless about the issue of falsity, the first amendment would have no
applicability. 130 Because knowledge is a wholly subjective factor, it is
naturally difficult to prove. This difficulty, however, has not prevented
the Court from employing the knowing-or-reckless-falsehood standard
in the defamation area, 3' quite probably because of the unattractive-
ness of the alternatives-either allowing even conscious falsehoods to go
unregulated or regulating even good faith factual assertions.
Reasonable inferences drawn from objective data often may prove
state of mind. 32 Thus, in the area of product health claims, a complete
absence of even arguably probative scientific data to support the claim
reasonably could be found to constitute recklessness, if not actual
knowledge of falsity, which renders regulation constitutional. The fact
that a health claim departs from governing scientific consensus should
not alone, however, be deemed a sufficient basis to justify a finding of
either knowledge of falsity or recklessness, because the principle of
epistemological humility plays such an important role in both free
speech theory in general and free scientific inquiry in particular. 33
Thus, reliance by federal regulatory agencies on departure from scien-
tific consensus as a basis for the prohibition of health claims should be
deemed to violate the first amendment, at least to the extent commer-
128. See Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 66 (1976) (stating that the "ques-
tion whether speech is, or is not, protected by the First Amendment often depends on the content
of the speech"). The Court has recognized that even fully protected expression may be regulated
on the showing of a compelling governmental interest. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 533-34 (1980).
129. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); see also supra note 24
and accompanying text.
130. The Court has considered various aspects of the fact-finding process on the knowledge-
of-falsity issue in several decisions. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986)
(concerning appropriate summary judgment standard); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979)
(concerning scope of discovery on knowledge-of-falsity issue); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S.
727 (1968) (significantly curbing the jury's fact-finding authority in determining whether a defend-
ant in a defamation action brought by a public figure has acted with reckless disregard of the truth
or falsity of his statements).
131. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 129-30.
132. See 10A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2730
(1983 & Supp. 1990).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 55-61.
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cial advertisements containing scientific claims are deemed to be fully
protected expression. The knowledge-or-reckless-disregard standard
probably could be applied, however, when the advertiser or communica-
tor misrepresents the current state of the scientific consensus, even
though reasonable difference of opinion may exist over the scientific re-
ality. Nevertheless, because the need for open scientific debate is so in-
grained in our constitutional tradition, governmental regulation should
be allowed only when the danger to the public is great, and the adver-
tiser's claim is patently inaccurate.
Arguably, under certain circumstances a compelling interest may
be found to justify regulation, even in the absence of a finding of con-
scious or reckless falsity. If the government can demonstrate that seri-
ous physical harm may result from the listener's belief of what is
universally deemed a scientifically inaccurate health claim made about
a product, the governmental interest in regulation conceivably could be
deemed compelling. Because in such a case the government always has
available the option of prohibiting the actual sale, T'3 however, and be-
cause, by hypothesis, at least an arguable scientific basis for the health
claim is assumed to exist,135 first amendment interests would be served
better by prohibiting regulation of the claim. In any event, to the extent
the first amendment interest is deemed outbalanced by the compelling
governmental interest in safety, the result logically should be similar for
claims made by neutral scientists, as well as commercial advertisers.
D. Equating Scientific and Commercial Expression: The "Dilution"
Danger
The standards adopted for the regulation of a manufacturer's
health claims" 6 must be nearly identical to those employed to test the
constitutionality of the hypothetical regulation of the same comments
made by neutral scientists to roughly the same audience. Full protec-
tion for one must be full protection for the other. If distinctions in the
amount of protection are to be drawn, it must be because the difference
in the source of the communication somehow gives rise to a difference
in the amount of harm caused by the expression, justifying the finding
of a compelling interest in one situation but not the other.
In one sense, a health claim made by a product's manufacturer,
134. Such economic activity is classifiable as conduct rather than protected speech. See
supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
135. As previously noted, if there existed absolutely no evidentiary basis to support the sci-
entific claim, it is likely that the claim reasonably could be found to have been made with either
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth or falsity. See supra text accompanying notes
129-33.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 129-35.
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rather than a neutral scientist, is actually likely to reduce the danger of
harm because a consumer is much more inclined to be skeptical of
claims made by an interested manufacturer than by an objective ob-
server. 137 In another sense, however, a claim made by the manufacturer,
at least when it is included in a product advertisement or label, may be
given greater credence by consumers, because of the reasonable as-
sumption that the manufacturer would not be allowed to make such
claims if the relevant regulatory agencies had deemed them to be false
or deceptive. This is not an assumption that a consumer reasonably
could make about the claims of an objective scientific observer. That
distinction, nevertheless, would not justify a ban on health claims found
to be inconsistent with governing scientific consensus because a compel-
ling interest standard demands that governmental regulation be struc-
tured narrowly to be no more intrusive than necessary. 38 Rather,
requiring inclusion of a disclaimer of governmental approval could sat-
isfy the legitimate governmental interest in avoiding consumer confu-
sion. Thus, the FTC reasonably might require an advertiser to state
that the Commission takes no position on the validity of the health
claim being made. In this manner, the legitimate regulatory interest
may be satisfied without significantly interfering with the advertiser's
right to contribute to the public debate concerning the product's health
impact.
Other than this one exception, no legitimate basis in first amend-
ment theory exists for differentiating the scope of constitutionally valid
regulatory authority between the scientific claims made by a commer-
cial manufacturer and those made by an objective scientific observer.
This position, however, might be subjected to the criticism that equat-
ing commercial and scientific expression, even for the limited purpose
of scientific claims for products, could lead to a dangerous dilution of
traditionally protected expression. 39 The fear is that the equation of
the two types of expression will lead to a reduction in the level of pro-
tection given the traditional category as much as it will lead to an in-
crease in the protection of the commercially motivated expression. This
concern apparently grows out of the assumption that the Court will up-
137. See Redish, supra note 19, at 461 n.163 (stating that it "should be questioned ...
whether the consuming public would be more likely to believe Dr. Linus Pauling or the orange
juice companies when they say that vitamin C cures colds").
138. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
139. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (stating that to
"require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech alike
could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the Amendment's guarantee with
respect to the latter kind of speech"); see also Barrett, "The Uncharted Area"- Commercial
Speech and the First Amendment, 13 U.C. DAvis L. Rav. 175, 208-09 (1980).
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hold a certain degree of regulatory authority over commercial speech,
no matter what, and that its equation with traditional subjects of ex-
pression necessarily will lead to a reduction of the traditional protection
to the lowest common denominator.
The dilution concern, however, fallaciously places the conceptual
cart before the horse. Unless one can justify rationally, at the outset,
the distinction in treatment between the different types of expression in
terms of free speech theory, the dilution criticism is misplaced. If one
assumes that the two forms of speech serve the same values and give
rise to the same harms, then those concerned about the danger of dilu-
tion logically should focus their criticism on the Court for irrationally
failing to raise the level of constitutional protection it gives to commer-
cial speech. If, on the other hand, one finds that a compelling interest
justifies the Court's upholding of commercial speech regulation, and if
one still cannot find a theoretically sound basis for providing greater
protection to the traditional form of expression, then logically one
should not fear the possibly diluting effect caused by the equation of
the two types of speech.
One who believes that free speech theory logically justifies reduced
protection for commercial speech 140 need not rely on the dilution fear to
justify the distinction. Those who rely on nothing more than the con-
cern over dilution to reject commercial speech protection, then, simply
are evoking the intuitive, nonrational assumption that speech by a com-
mercial advertiser is somehow beneath traditional first amendment con-
cerns.14 ' My goal here has been to demonstrate that speech by a
commercial enterprise concerning the scientific properties of its product
deserves as full first amendment protection as similar statements made
by an objective scientific observer. Unless one accurately can point out
the fallacies in my logic, the fear that the level of constitutional protec-
tion given pure scientific expression may be reduced as a result should
carry no weight.
E. Epistemological Humility, Constitutional Fact, and Judicial
Review of Administrative Findings of Falsity
Assume, as is the likely case under existing doctrine, that scientific
claims, when included as part of a direct commercial promotion, are
deemed to constitute commercial speech and receive the reduced level
of first amendment protection provided by the Central Hudson test." 2
Under the first prong of this standard, a finding of the claim's falsity
140. See sources cited supra note 14.
141. See generally Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 14.
142. See supra text accompanying note 33.
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automatically removes the speech from the scope of the first amend-
ment, but a finding that the claim is truthful will lead to a substantial
degree of constitutional protection against governmental regulation.14"
The truth or falsity of the advertiser's claim, then, often will determine
the constitutionality of the challenged regulation.
In light of this analysis, it is amazing that the post-Bolger lower
court decisions so uniformly have ceded enormous discretion to the ad-
ministrative regulator to determine the truth or falsity of the adver-
tiser's claim.144 Both statutory'45 and judicial' 46 traditions have granted
broad judicial deference to administrative fact-finding within the scope
of the agency's expertise. An equally venerable tradition, 141 however, re-
quires that issues of "constitutional fact" must be examined de novo by
the reviewing court.148 A "constitutional fact" is a factual determination
that, if resolved one way, will render governmental action constitutional
and, if resolved another way, will render it unconstitutional. When the
issue of constitutionality implicates liberty interests, 4 e the Supreme
Court consistently has held that our system of separation of powers de-
mands independent judicial determination of such factual issues. The
reasons for the rule are clear. As I have argued previously in another
context:
Nonjudicial administrative regulators of expression exist for the sole purpose of
regulating; this is their raison d'etre. They simultaneously perform the functions of
prosecutor and adjudicator and, if only subconsciously, will likely feel the obliga-
tion to justify their existence by finding some expression constitutionally subject to
regulation. Such a systemic danger does not plague the functioning of a judicial
143. See supra text accompanying notes 48-53.
144. A leading example is the decision in Federal Trade Comm'n v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The FTC had sought to enjoin the advertising of
cigarette tar content alleged to be deceptive. The company disputed the application of the FTC's
method employed to test the ratings. The D.C. Circuit, in affirming the grant of the injunction,
noted that a court can overrule an agency's decision only when that decision is arbitrary or capri-
cious. Id. at 44; see also Bristol-Myers Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 738 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Pharmtech Research, Inc., 576 F.
Supp. 294 (D.D.C. 1983).
145. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988) (arbitrary or capricious standard of review).
146. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
147. This tradition is associated primarily with the famed decision in Crowell v. Benson, 285
U.S. 22 (1932).
148. In St. Joseph Stock Yards v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936), the Supreme Court
modified Crowell's requirement that the reviewing court hold a de novo hearing on the issue of
constitutional fact, but reiterated the requirement of de novo review.
149. While the Crowell doctrine generally fell into disrepute in property rights cases as the
level of constitutional protection for those rights diminished, see Schwartz, Does the Ghost of
Crowell v. Benson Still Walk?, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 163 (1949), in personal liberty suits it has retained
vitality. See, e.g., Cross v. United States 512 F.2d 1212, 1217 (4th Cir. 1975) (reviewing grocery
store's qualification for food stamp program); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) (finding film
Carnal Knowledge not obscene); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 190 n.6 (1964) (finding of
obscenity).
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forum. In addition, the tradition of independence from external political pressure
provides grounds for preferring judicial to administrative adjudication. 150
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held that, because obscene expres-
sion falls outside the scope of first amendment protection,'51 findings of
obscenity are constitutional facts subject to de novo judicial review.15 2
No basis exists for distinguishing findings of falsity for commercial
speech.
Moreover, the framework established by the principle of epistemo-
logical humility should give us pause before we allow a formal govern-
mental finding that a certain scientific assertion is false. Thus, even if
we acknowledge that in extreme cases the government may make such
findings, and even if we concede that such scientific assertions are to
receive only the reduced protection associated with commercial speech,
at the very least we should demand that such findings be made by the
single independent governmental organ ultimately entrusted with the
task of protecting free and open communication: the judiciary.
IV. CONCLUSION
The public today is sensitive to the impact of the foods it consumes
and the products it uses to improve its health. As a result, manufactur-
ers also have become more sensitive to the implications that their prod-
ucts have for public health. In the true tradition of American
capitalism, commercial enterprises have determined that health sells,
and to a large extent they have devoted their research, marketing, and
advertising resources toward both improving the health impact of their
products and informing the public of those improvements. 15 Thus, al-
lowing manufacturers to emphasize the health implications of their
products likely will increase public awareness of these health concerns.
Expression by those with the greatest incentive to speak will increase
the level of public awareness about issues that directly will affect their
lives and over which they have control. This represents the classic role
that free expression can and should play in our society. The level of
public interest in communication and information concerning the
health implications of everyday products is no less when that informa-
150. M. REDISH, supra note 3, at 148-49 (footnotes omitted).
151. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
152. Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 190 n.6.
153. One illustration is the cereal market, in which there exists "clear evidence that...
producer advertising and labeling added significant amounts of information to the market and
reached groups that were not reached well by government and general information sources." P.
IPPOLITO & A. MATHIOS, HEALTH CLAIMS IN ADvERTISING AND LABELING: A STUDY OF THE CEREAL
MARKET iX (1989). The same authors assert that "producer advertising was a significant source of
information on the potential benefits of fiber." Id. at xi.
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tion comes from the manufacturer of those products than when the
same information comes from an objective scientific or medical expert.
When speech is allowed to be "uninhibited, robust, and wide
open,"' 154 there exist risks of misinformation, confusion, and even decep-
tion. Recognition that such communications deserve full first amend-
ment protection, however, does not imply that society is defenseless
against intentional economic fraud. The first amendment, even in its
most classic applications, is not an absolute. Because of the historical
lessons taught us by the principle of epistemological humility, however,
we should hesitate to stifle scientific assertions simply because they are
inconsistent with current scientific consensus. One of the fundamental
premises of the first amendment is that, except in the most extreme
cases, the proper response to speech we deem inaccurate is not repres-
sion but rather counter speech.155 The Court adheres to this principle
for political speech, regardless of the speaker's motivation. There is no
reason, in either logic or history, to treat scientific expression any
differently.
154. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
155. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., con-
curring); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (stating that "[h]owever
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and
juries but on the competition of other ideas").
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